

The Deliberations of the Countries of Northeast Asia concerning the Post-2012 Negotiations at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen

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I. Introduction

The acuteness of the problem of climate change associated with growing anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) has become an increasing concern globally. Less than a month remains before the deadline for creating the post-2012 framework for addressing this problem at the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held in Copenhagen this December.¹ The international community's anxiety about missing the deadline for sealing the new deal is on the rise, however, and there are calls for definitive action by the negotiators. According to "Carbon News and Info" (2009), the second-to-last negotiating session before Copenhagen, which was held from 28 September to 9 October 2009 in Bangkok, made little or no progress on a concrete negotiating text to replace or extend the Kyoto Protocol. The final round of climate change negotiations before the Copenhagen deal will be held on 2-6 November 2009 in Barcelona. As indicated at the closing press briefing of the Bangkok session by Mr. Yvo de Boer, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Executive Secretary, all the ingredients for a successful outcome in Copenhagen are on the table, but there are still long-held differences. Despite world leaders setting out a clear mandate to prevent dangerous climate change at the New York Summit held two weeks prior to that session, governments have not yet made clear all of their commitments which will make it work in practice.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommends that in order to limit global warming to 2°C above the pre-industrial level by the end of this century the developed countries have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25% to 40% compared with their 1990 levels by 2020, whereas the global level of emissions must observe its peak by 2015. According to a new version of an informal paper prepared for the Bangkok talks by the UNFCCC secretariat, pledges for emission reduction targets submitted by Annex I Parties² indicated that the aggregate emission reductions by these parties are expected to be between 15-23% below 1990 levels in 2020.

According to the IPCC, global mean temperatures rose by 0.7°C in the 20th century. Scientists believe that a 2°C target would avoid climate change dangerous to life on the planet and the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere must be stabilized below 450 parts per million

(ppm). The current atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration is around 380 ppm and it is rising. At the same time, at the last United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Poznań, Poland, the youth group asked the delegates to sign a pledge promising to "safeguard the future of all countries and peoples" and staged a demonstration at the conference venue with the slogan "Survival is not negotiable." Survival means doing more, and faster, to curb CO₂ emissions by setting a new bottom line for action on global warming of 350 ppm for the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere by 2050, to replace the current target of 450 ppm. The former US Vice-President and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Al Gore, who addressed the conference earlier the same day, has supported this new bottom line for toughening the goal to 350 ppm, as 450 ppm is inadequate.

Northeast Asian countries, representing more than a quarter of the world in terms of both economy and population, are diverse in terms of their socio-economic development and industrial structures. According to the current Kyoto Protocol arrangements, two industrialized countries in Northeast Asia, Japan and Russia, have quantified, legally-binding emissions reduction targets for the first commitment period of 2008-2012, although Russia is undergoing economic transition. The other countries in the region do not have any such commitments for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, but they obviously could not simply be exempted from further definitive action on reducing their anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, the ROK, as an OECD member, expects to have quantified GHG reduction targets in the post-2012 period, while China, as a fast growing and the top emitting economy in the world, is drawing international attention regarding the post-2012 negotiations. Mongolia, the smallest economy in transition and the smallest-scale polluter in the region, is already witnessing the adverse impact of climate change. Therefore, the effects of Northeast Asian countries' actions and further plans for reducing their anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions could be viewed as a good indicator of global endeavors under the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities. With respect to this, this piece examines to what extent the countries in Northeast Asia have been in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and what positions they will take at the upcoming negotiations on the post-2012 framework in Copenhagen.

¹ This article was written in early November 2009.

² Industrialized countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC and which have quantified emission reduction commitments during the first commitment period (i.e. 2008-2012) of the Kyoto Protocol.

II. The CO₂ Emissions from the Combustion of Fuel by Northeast Asian Countries

Although energy is an integral part of economic development, it represents about 65% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, which are recognized to be the prime cause of climate change. According to the IEA (2009), the current world energy mix is dominated by the direct combustion of fossil fuels, and CO₂ emissions from energy account for 60% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions—about 80% for the Annex I countries. All the countries in Northeast Asia are among the most polluting economies in the world, either by their total CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion or by the emission intensities of their economies (Table 1).

In 2007, four countries in the region, China, Russia, Japan and the ROK, were among the top ten emitters worldwide, while Mongolia and the DPRK were among the top five emission intensive economies globally. Japan has to reduce its GHG emissions by 6% from its 1990 level, while Russia is required to limit them to its 1990 level during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Japan's CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion, however, increased by 16.1% between 1990 and 2007, while those of Russia decreased by 27.2%. Cumulatively, it resulted in a 14.9% reduction of the aggregate CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion of Annex I countries in Northeast Asia. At the same time, the ROK and China witnessed massive rises in their CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion. China's CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion almost tripled, making the country the world's largest emitter, while those of the ROK more than doubled during the period 1990-2007. Mongolia and the DPRK had 10.9% and 45.3% reductions, respectively, in their CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion in 2007 from those in 1990. Thus, the combined CO₂

emissions from fuel combustion in Northeast Asia increased by 62% during the period 1990-2007, bringing its share to 32.5% of global emissions in 2007, up from 27.7% in 1990. At the same time, the combined GDP of the Northeast Asian countries went up by 94.1%. For comparison, global emissions and GDP increased by 38% and 84.5%, respectively, during the same period. The emissions reductions in Russia, Mongolia and the DPRK were mainly linked to declines in energy demand associated with the slowdown and stagnation of the economies due to transitional hurdles following the collapse of the socialist world, rather than being the result of robust emission reduction measures in the countries. Russia and Mongolia's GDP in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) only increased by 5.3% and 62.3%, respectively, over the almost two-decade period between 1990 and 2007, while the DPRK witnessed the economy shrink more than a quarter during that same period. The total primary energy supply (TPES) in 2007 was 44.7% lower in the DPRK, compared to the 1990 level, while that in Russia and Mongolia fell 22.7% and 9.7%, respectively.

In terms of emissions intensity, Northeast Asian countries had varied performances during the period 1990-2007. In all the countries in 2007 CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion per unit of GDP dropped in comparison to their 1990 levels. China's CO₂ emission per unit of GDP evaluated in PPP in 2007 dropped almost to half of the level in 1990, while emissions per capita and emissions per unit of TPES rose by 134.5% and 20.3%, respectively, over the period. Despite some improvements in emission intensity indicators, Mongolia and the DPRK were among the top five emission intensive economies on earth and CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP accounted for 1.63 kg and 1.56 kg, respectively, in 2007. Additionally, the TPES

Table 1 Economic and Emission Indicators of Northeast Asian Countries, 2007

Indicators	Annex I Countries		Non-Annex I Countries				World
	Japan	Russia	OECD	Developing			
			ROK	China*	Mongolia	DPRK	
GDP PPP, 2000 US\$ billion	3,620.2 (26.3%)	1,603.7 (5.3%)	1,065.7 (148.9%)	9,911.8 (437%)	6.9 (62.3%)	40.0 (-26.9%)	61,428 (84.5%)
Per capita GDP PPP, 2000 US\$	28,336.5 (22%)	11,322.9 (10.2%)	21,994.2 (120.2%)	7,509.0 (361.9%)	2,649.7 (30.8%)	1,683.2 (-38.1%)	9,294.2 (46.8%)
TPES, million ton of oil equivalent	513.5 (17.2%)	672.1 (-22.7%)	222.2 (138.7%)	1,955.8 (126.6%)	3.1 (-9.7%)	18.4 (-44.7%)	12,029.8 (37.3%)
CO ₂ emissions from fuel combustion, sectoral approach million ton of CO ₂	1,236.3 (16.1%)	1,587.4 (-27.2%)	488.7 (113.1%)	6,027.9 (172.6%)	11.3 (-10.9%)	62.3 (-45.3%)	28,962.4 (38%)
CO ₂ /GDP PPP, kg CO ₂ per 2000 US\$	0.34 (-8.1%)	0.99 (-30.8%)	0.46 (-14.3%)	0.61 (-49.2%)	1.63 (-45.1%)	1.56 (-25.2%)	0.47 (-25.2%)
CO ₂ /population, ton CO ₂ per capita	9.68 (12.2%)	10.09 (88.6%)	11.21 (-23.8%)	4.57 (134.5%)	4.32 (-28.1%)	2.62 (-53.7%)	4.38 (9.8%)
CO ₂ /TPES, ton CO ₂ per TJ	57.5 (-1%)	56.4 (-5.7%)	52.5 (-10.7%)	73.6 (20.3%)	87.3 (-1.4%)	81.0 (-1.2%)	57.5 (0.5%)

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are the changes from 1990 2. *Excludes Hong Kong

3. TJ = terajoules

Source: IEA (2009)

emission intensities of Mongolia, the DPRK and China were well above the world average, while those of Japan and Russia were at around the world average of 57.5 tonnes and 56.4 tonnes of CO₂ per terajoule of energy production. In 2007 China's emission intensity was 20.3% higher than in 1990. The ROK was the front runner in Northeast Asia in terms of improving emissions intensity, while sustaining high economic growth in that period. CO₂ emissions per unit of energy production in the ROK dropped by 10.7% between 1990 and 2007, compared to a mere 1% drop in Japan. Per capita emissions in 2007 in the ROK, however, were the same as the average for Annex I Parties of 11.21 tonnes. Russia and Japan also had high per capita emissions amounting to 10.09 tonnes for Russia and 9.68 tonnes for Japan. Both countries' per capita emissions in 2007 were higher than their values in 1990. At the same time, the values for CO₂ emissions per capita in 2007 in Mongolia (4.32 tonnes CO₂ per capita) and China (4.57 tonnes CO₂ per capita) were around the world average. For China, however, the value was up 134.5% from the 1990 level, contrasting with a 28.1% drop for Mongolia in that period. The DPRK's per capita emissions were the lowest in the region amounting to 2.62 CO₂ tonnes in 2007, yet almost twice as high as the average value for Asia. Therefore all the countries in Northeast Asia need to take more robust action if they are to realize the global mission of arresting and eventually reducing the concentration of anthropogenic GHGs in the earth's atmosphere (Table 1).

III. Northeast Asian Positions on the Post-2012 Framework

Schemes for Northeast Asian environmental cooperation in the post-Kyoto period were discussed at the last Northeast Asia International Conference for Economic Development (NICE) in Niigata held on 16-17 February 2009, where experts examined various approaches toward cooperation schemes for the reduction of greenhouse gases in the Northeast Asian region. Amongst the policy proposals put forward by the participants were:

- "In the policy design of the post-Kyoto regime, we shall explore different possibilities beyond the continuation of the Kyoto approach. In this effort, it is important to pay attention to national circumstances as well as the respective capabilities of the countries"; and
- "We shall explore continuing and improving the market-based mechanisms, such as the CDM in the post-Kyoto regime".

2009 was a crucial and dynamic year in the process of negotiating the post-Kyoto climate regime and we could observe a number of turning points in the national governments' positions on building the regime. A detailed report about the above mentioned discussion was published in *ERINA Report Volume 87*. Key developments in the course of the Northeast Asian countries' creating their positions on the post-2012 climate regime are briefly described below.

A. Legal form: New protocol versus the Kyoto Protocol:

Concerning the legal form of the post-2012 framework, Japan proposes the adoption of a single new protocol at

Copenhagen to replace the current Kyoto Protocol. Mr. Akihiko Furuya, Ambassador for Global Environmental Affairs of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his letter attached to the proposed draft text submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat on 16 June 2009 indicated that Japan is not in a position to accept a simple extension of the current Kyoto Protocol through amending Annex B. According to the draft, Japan proposes a new amendment, C, which would include Non-Annex I Parties for whom it would be mandatory to take appropriate GHG mitigation action as a part of their national action plans and include quantified elements to the extent possible. In addition, in order to substantially limit GHG emission growth for the parties included in Annex C, those which make a substantial contribution to global emissions shall have their own GHG emission intensity targets for a prescribed commitment period. Moreover, the draft text proposes changing the host country status for the clean development mechanism from the current Non-Annex I Parties to the parties included in Annex C.

Russia is a key player in global climate politics, both as a one of the major emitters and as well as a large consumer and a major exporter of fossil fuels. Because of the surplus allowances available to the country during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia was not required to cut emissions under the Kyoto Protocol and therefore had little or no incentive to introduce any serious mitigation policies. The post-Kyoto climate regime, however, will be a radically different operational environment for Russia, as the country's economy and emissions are both on the rise.

Russia shares the view that global emission reduction targets can only be met by global efforts, and by the contributions of the major economies in particular. Russia suggested taking a nationally-initiated, bottom-up approach in establishing mid-term targets based on the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities and individual capabilities. While sharing the view of halving global GHG emissions by 2050, Russia considers it unreasonable to set any collective range of emissions reductions for Annex I Parties and urged a re-grouping of the Annex I and Non-Annex I countries, indicating that the current grouping is obsolete and irrelevant to present day realities. Furthermore, Russia proposed that discussions on the domestic circumstances of a country should consider several factors related to the energy demands for providing the normal living conditions specific to an individual country. These factors would include, for example, the area of the country, the population-weighted average distance between the ten major cities, climate conditions with respect to the spatial distribution of the population (e.g. population-weighted heating degree days), and the net exports, etc., of major developed economies. (Tulinov, S, 2009).

China, however, aligned with other developing countries, strongly affirms that the Kyoto Protocol "must be renewed and strengthened" and sees Japan's proposal as a "killing attempt" on the Kyoto Protocol by the developed countries. China's special envoy for climate, Ambassador Yu Qingtai, said at the session in Bangkok: "Don't kill the Kyoto Protocol and don't derail our Copenhagen train" (Shamsuddoha, Md., 2009). On 20 May 2009 China's

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), issued a news release entitled "Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference", in which it presented its position on the post-2012 climate negotiations in Copenhagen. The NDRC performs the general work, and within it is the General Office of the National Leading Group to Address Climate Change, headed by the Chinese premier. It made a clear message on the validity of the current Kyoto Protocol by indicating that the Kyoto Protocol will not be terminated with the expiry of its first commitment period and indicated that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) is by no means to rewrite the Kyoto Protocol, but is to set further quantified emission reduction commitments for developed countries (NDRC, 2009). Therefore China urges the setting of further quantified emission reduction commitments by the developed countries through amending Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (SCPRC, 2008).

B. GHG emissions reduction targets:

At the United Nations Summit on Climate Change held on 22 September 2009 in New York, Japan's Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, declared Japan's mid-term goal of a GHG emissions reduction of 25% by 2020 from the 1990 level, pointing out that this goal is a public pledge which his party made in its election manifesto. Japan's new government plans to mobilize all available policy tools to achieve the target, including—but not limited to—the introduction of a domestic emissions-trading mechanism, feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, and the consideration of a global warming tax. As reiterated by Mr. Hatoyama, Japan's commitment to the world is, however, subject to having a fair and effective international framework in which all major economies participate, with ambitious targets as well (MOFA, 2009). Mr. Hatoyama's pledge on GHG reduction won great applause from world leaders. Some analysts, and especially business leaders in Japan, however, are doubtful about this ambitious target. The Japan Business Federation expressed that they would oppose any GHG emissions cut greater than 6% and indicated that in terms of viability and an acceptable financial burden on consumers the "most rational goal" would be a 4% increase from the 1990 level by 2020 (The Japan Times Weekly, 2009). Additionally, some business leaders have also warned that the target 25% emission cut in Japan would force ailing manufactures to flee overseas and the estimated burden per individual in Japan would be 360,000 yen per annum (Bülow, 2009a). Earlier, in June, Japan's then Prime Minister, Taro Aso, declared that Japan will cut its GHG emissions by 15% by 2020 from 2005 levels. It was equivalent to only an 8% cut from the 1990 level and it fuelled strong criticism from the international community (Bom, 2009).

Russia, the other Annex I country in the region, is ready for a 10% to 15% GHG emissions cut for the country by 2020 from the 1990 level as its commitment to joining

the global goal of halving GHG emissions by 2050 from 1990 levels. This target was stated by the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, in the interview he gave to RIA Novosti after the G8 summit held in Italy in July 2009. In September, however, Russia's Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, reiterated that Russia will not agree with an approach that allows the exclusion of the leading polluters and leading economies, referring to the United States and China (Bülow, 2009b; Jerichow, 2009). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the country's target for 2020 would result in a cumulative GHG emission reduction of about 30 billion tonnes over the period 1990-2020. In addition, the Russian government aims to implement measures to cut the energy intensity of the economy by 40% by 2020 compared to the 2007 level (MID, 2009). Earlier, in June, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the country's emissions target would be a 30% increase in GHG emissions by 2020 from the current level. This scheme would see Russia's GHG emissions at 10% to 15% below the 1990 level, but it has the implication that Russia's GHG emissions would rise further to 3 billion tonnes in 2020 from 2.2 billion tonnes in 2007, which angered the environmentalists (Bülow, 2009c).

On the other hand, China urges that the developed countries' aggregate GHG emissions reduction should be at least 40% below the 1990 level by 2020 in consideration of the countries' historical responsibility and levels of development. Based on the UNFCCC core principle of "common, but differentiated responsibilities", however, China is proposing that developing countries take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development and in line with the legitimate priority needs of development and poverty eradication. NAMAs are to be initiated by developing countries themselves, and include concrete GHG mitigation policies, actions and projects. Therefore, the GHG mitigation action of NAMAs is voluntary and distinct from international legally-binding commitments by developed countries. In addition, China points out that the emission reductions achieved by NAMAs shall not be used to offset the quantified emission reduction targets of developed countries (NDRC, 2009).

Moreover, some Chinese researchers suggest that it would be most appropriate for China to join the international climate regime by offering her own targets for the energy intensity of the economy. Due to China's rapid economic development and inadequate economic structure, it would be quite hard for the Chinese government to reach numerical targets for the reduction of the country's aggregate GHG emissions. In fact, China's 11th Five Year Plan sets a target to reduce the energy intensity of the economy in 2010 by 20% from its 2005 level. This target is one of the biggest efforts toward GHG mitigation and if it is achieved, it could result in a CO₂ reduction of 410 million tonnes compared to a baseline case of no energy intensity change (Jiang³, 2009). This amount equals 18.5% of China's total CO₂ emissions from the combustion of fuel in 1990.

³ Jiang Kejun is Director of the Energy System Analysis and Market Analysis Division, the Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission, China.

The ROK is currently not an Annex I country, and therefore did not have a quantified emissions reduction commitment during the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period. As an OECD member and one of the top ten emitting countries, the ROK, however, is preparing to set voluntary GHG emission reduction targets by 2020. The ROK government plans to announce its target for 2020, taking one of the following three options: (a) an 8% increase from the 2005 level; (b) no change from the 2005 level; and (c) 4% below the 2005 level. Analysts see the ROK's targets to be relatively modest compared to OECD countries, but acknowledge that the ROK's voluntary initiative might encourage other bigger emitters from Non-Annex countries, such as China, to follow suit (Bom, 2009d).

C. Other major provisions:

According to the Bali Action Plan (BAP), adopted at the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Bali (COP 13), along with a shared vision for long-term cooperative action and GHG mitigation issues, the upcoming post-2012 climate regime shall deal with other essential elements, such as adaptation to climate change, development and transfer of technology, and financial resources and investments. These issues are especially important and a real challenge for developing countries.

China sees that the adaptation, technology transfer and financial support for developing countries should be given equal priority to GHG mitigation. China proposes to establish a Convention Adaptation Fund, a Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund, a Mitigation Fund, and a Capacity Building Fund, along with Subsidiary Bodies on Adaptation, and Technology Development and Transfer under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC. China urges the developed countries to provide new, additional, adequate and predictable finances to these funds at a scale of 0.5% to 1% of their annual GDP. Furthermore, China proposes establishing a follow-up mechanism for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to monitor the developed countries' provision of adequate financing, technology and capacity building support to developing countries and evaluate the adequacy of such support (NDRC, 2009). Japan supports using the existing institutional mechanisms in arranging the finance. The scale of financing required for adaptation was a major element of discussions in Bangkok and the scales vary between studies. Oxfam estimated it to be more than US\$50 billion; the UNDP, US\$86 billion; the UNFCCC, US\$28-67 billion; and the World Bank, US\$75-100 billion per annum.

The ROK proposed including a UNFCCC provision on a low-carbon development roadmap that calls on the

Table 2 Northeast Asian Proposals for the Post-2012 Framework

Northeast Asian Country		Legal Form	Emission Reduction Targets	Other	
Annex I Parties	Japan	a. Replacement of the Kyoto Protocol by a single new protocol; b. Include Annex C	25% GHG emission reduction by 2020 from 1990 level	Set emission intensity target requirements for Annex C countries	
	Russia*	Regrouping of Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties	10-15% cut in GHG emissions by 2020 from 1990 level	Consideration of several factors in defining national domestic circumstances	
Non-Annex I Parties	OECD Member	ROK	N/A	I. Include a provision on low carbon development within the UNFCCC; II. Establish registry and crediting mechanisms for NAMAs	
	Developing	China	Amendment of Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol with second commitment period	At least 40% aggregate reduction by 2020 from 1990 level for developed countries	I. Establish funds: - Convention Adaptation Fund; - Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund; - Mitigation Fund; - Capacity Building Fund II. Establish new Subsidiary Bodies: - on adaptation; - on technology development and transfer III. Form regional adaptation centers IV. Set M&E mechanism
		Mongolia*	Supports extension of the Kyoto Protocol	N/A	Emphasis on adaptation.
		DPRK	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes: 1. * country that is undergoing the process of transition to a market economy

2. N/A = not applicable/available

developed countries to provide the appropriate policy tools and the necessary support to developing countries for their simultaneous pursuit of GHG reduction and economic development. Additionally, the ROK proposes establishing a registry and crediting mechanisms for the NAMAs of developing countries (UNFCCC, 2009). Mongolia supports the view of extending the Kyoto Protocol and places emphasis on adaptation. A brief summary of the above proposals specified by the countries in Northeast Asia for the post-2012 climate regime are illustrated in Table 2.

IV. Conclusion

The world community is looking forward to a successful deal on the post-2012 climate regime in Copenhagen later this year. Being a unique combination of developed and developing countries, the countries in the Northeast Asian region will play a crucial role in the successful negotiation of the post-2012 climate deal. Assessment of the current proposals deliberated on by national governments toward this deal, however, reveals that there is still a conspicuous gap among the national government positions, while the remaining time for reaching a consensus in Copenhagen is very limited.

The fact that the aggregate GHG emissions in Northeast Asian countries have grown at a pace faster than the world average over the period 1990-2007 indicates the relatively poor performance of the Northeast Asian countries in reducing emissions in the past. The region's growing share of global emissions and faster than average growth rate in their economies taken as a whole, however, necessitate greater responsibilities for these countries in the global race to curb emissions. Therefore it is an urgent task for all the countries in the region to shift their positions from the national view toward a global perspective and stimulate effective multilateral cooperation.

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